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III. BOOKS AND MAGAZINES
A. Copyright
1. Agreements With Authors Regarding Idea Submissions
Should Be Specific
When the bargaining powers of one party greatly outweigh those
of another, the doctrine of unjust enrichment can be applied to over-
come such inequity.' In a recent decision by a New York district court,
a free-lance journalist was permitted to amend her complaint (after she
had rested her case) to provide a quasi-contractual basis upon which
she could recover against the Reader's Digest Association.2 The court
granted her relief on a theory of unjust enrichment, describing this case
as one which would result in an "injustice of the most fundamental
sort" if the Reader's Digest Association were permitted to enjoy the
benefits of plaintiffs idea without just compensation.'
The controversy of this case began in November of 1978, when the
plaintiff, Rosella Werlin, submitted an article to the Reader's Digest, a
monthly magazine published by the defendant Reader's Digest Associ-
ation (RDA).4 Werlin had been a journalist for over fifty years and
had published articles in various periodicals throughout the nation.5 In
1971, Werlin submitted an article to the RDA for the first time which
was subsequently rejected.6 In 1972, she attended the Southwest Writ-
ers Conference in Houston and met the managing editor for RDA, Mr.
John H. Allen.7 Allen spoke on behalf of RDA to encourage unknown
writers to submit their articles for potential publication.8 During this
speech he informed his audience, including Werlin, of the type of sub-
jects which were classified by RDA as good areas for publication.9 Al-
len also outlined the then effective pay scale utilized by RDA in order
to pay for pieces submitted from the general populace.'° Allen did not
inform the audience that under certain circumstances an author might
1. Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
2. 528 F. Supp. at 467.
3. Id. at 466.
4. Id. at 454.
5. id.




10. Id. At the time Werlin submitted her article, RDA was paying $2,600 for "original"
articles or $3,500 for first person manuscripts. Id. at 455.
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only receive a $500.00 "kill fee" or a $250.00 "spotter's fee.""
Following Allen's speech, Werlin discussed with Allen her prior
attempt to be published by RDA. 2 At this time he encouraged her to
try again and stated that if a situation ever arose where Werlin submit-
ted an original article which was not publishable in its present form,
she could rewrite it with the help of RDA. 3 Allen did not tell her of
RDA's policy of using the topic of an already published original as a
basis upon which to prepare an original article for publication, in re-
turn for the "spotter's fee."' 4
From 1973 through 1976, Werlin sent articles to Allen to be con-
sidered for publication, only to be rejected. 5 However, RDA's notices
of rejection never criticized the quality of Werlin's work.'6 To the con-
trary, most of Allen's notes praised her improvement and encouraged
her to continue to make submissions.'
7
In 1978, Werlin completed an article entitled "Rina: A Child
Whose Problems Changed Many Lives."' 8 The central theme of this
article focused upon the life-long goal of Rina, a Down's Syndrome
child, to have a Bas Mitzvah.' 9 Following the article's completion,
Werlin disseminated copies for publication to a variety of local pa-
pers.2' The Houston's LegalAdvocate accepted and subsequently pub-
lished Werlin's story.2'
It is in light of this background that Werlin submitted her article to
RDA and unlike Werlin's previous experiences she did not receive a
rejection letter from them.2 2 Instead, she heard nothing until she spoke
with Rina's mother, who informed her that she had been contacted by
RDA and that Mr. Blank would be writing the article on Rina.2 3 At
11. Id. at 456. A "kill fee" is paid to an author if the RDA decides not to use the piece
at all while a "spotter's fee" is paid if RDA decides to have the topic rewritten by one of
their own staff writers. Id. at 455.
12. Id. at 456.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 456-57.
15. Id. at 457.
16. Id.
17. Id. Allen later stated that he had encouraged Werlin with the hope that she might
someday produce a useable product even though he personally believed that she was and is
incapable of doing so. Id.




22. Id. at 455, 457-58.
23. Id. at 458.
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this point Werlin called Blank to discuss the use of her article.24 Blank
informed her that RDA had decided to use the topic for an original
piece which Blank would write for RDA.25 Werlin offered to cooperate
with Blank on the article and demanded that she receive a by-line for
any article he put out on the topic. 26 Blank refused her offer, but of-
fered her $250.00 for "spotting" the idea for his new article. 27 Werlin
declined and wrote letters of complaint to Blank's editor at RDA.2"
Subsequently, RDA published Blank's article, for which he received
$3,500.00 in addition to his regular salary, while Werlin was sent a
check for $250.00 as a "spotter's fee." 2 9
Werlin filed suit against Blank and RDA for copyright infringe-
ment and misappropriation.3" During trial and at the close of her case,
Werlin moved to leave to further amend her complaint pursuant to
Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3' The court
granted this motion after defendants' counsel stated that such amend-
ment would not be prejudicial as long as the court confined its decision
to the existing record.32 This allowed Werlin to assert a quasi-contract
claim on the theory that defendants were unjustly enriched through
their use of the story idea in Werlin's article.
33
The first claim addressed by the court was Werlin's claim against
RDA for copyright infringement.34 In order to succeed on a claim for
copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show two things: ownership
of a valid copyright and that the defendant has copied the plaintiff's
35property.
Here, the court determined that Werlin's article sufficiently met
the ownership requirement. 36 Although Werlin did not place notice of
copyright upon all of her publicly distributed copies, as required by






29. Id. at 459.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 460.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976)).
35. Id. at 460 (citing Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090,
1092 (2d Cir. 1977); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 522 F. Supp. 125, 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
36. 528 F. Supp. at 460.
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pletion." Ordinarily, the omission of this notice will invalidate the
copyright.38 However, when the registration of an article has been or is
made within five years from the date of its publication the copyright is
preserved as long as a reasonable effort is made to add notice of copy-
right once its omission is discovered.39 Werlin registered her article in
1980 (well within the five-year requirement), and prevented the public
dissemination of other copies without notice after her discovery of the
omitted copyright.'
Since Werlin's article met the requirements for ownership of a
copyright, the court held that this right was not lost by publication in
the Houston's Legal Advocate without the affixed copyright notice.
41
Next, the court looked to whether the defendant "copied" the
plaintiff.42 Copying will be inferred when the plaintiff proves that the
defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the two works
are substantially similar.43 Since it was obvious that the defendant had
access to the article, the court focused upon the question of whether the
articles by Werlin and by Blank were substantially similar.'
The court stated that the general test to determine substantial simi-
larity is "whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work."
45
Copyright laws protect only the author's expression of an idea and not
the idea itself.46 Where a literary work is based upon historical events,
copyright protection extends only to the author's expression of those
events and not the event itself.
47
In order to apply these rules, the court must separate the non-pro-
tected event from the protected manner of expression48 and then com-
pare the manner of expression used by each author to determine
37. Id. at 460-61 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 302(a) (1976).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (1976).




43. Id. (citing Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir.
1981)).
44. Id. at 461. RDA stipulated that it received Werlin's article in November of 1978,
and Blank testified that he received a copy in December of 1978. Id.
45. Id. (citing Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
47. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978-79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
48. 528 F. Supp. at 462; see Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
[Vol. 4
BOOKS AND MAGAZINES
whether the latter work is substantially similar to the first.49
In this case, the court ruled that neither RDA's determination that
the subject of Werlin's article was a "viable" topic nor Blank's use of
facts substantially similar to those used by Werlin constituted infringe-
ment of Werlin's copyright." The former was held to be merely a du-
plication of Werlin's non-protectible idea, and as such could not form
the basis of a finding of infringement;5' the latter, as factual informa-
tion, was found to fall within the public domain.52
Thus, the court turned its attention to whether Blank's manner of
expression was substantially similar to that used in Werlin's article.53
There are two types of substantial similarity, neither of which require
any literal word-for-word duplication.54 The first type, referred to as
"comprehensive non-literal similarity," permits a finding of substantial
similarity where the fundamental essence or structure of a substantial
part of one work is duplicated in another even though there is no literal
duplication."55 The second type of substantial similarity, "fragmented
literal similarity," is found in spite of a lack of duplication of either the
essence or the structure if there are a number of instances of literal
similarity between the two works.56
First, the court addressed the question of whether there existed
any non-literal similarity between Werlin's and Blank's articles.57 To
do this the court used the "patterns" test "to determine whether Blank's
article 'tracked' in any material way, Werlin's treatment of events."58
49. 528 F. Supp. at 462.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 44-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
53. Id. at 462.
54. Id.
55. This distinction between the two types of substantial similarity is described by Pro-
fessor Nimmer in his treatise. See 3 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.03(MB)[a][l],
[2] (rev. ed. 1981).
As to the comprehensive, nonliteral similarity test, the court explained that the willing-
ness of the courts to use this test is based upon the principle that if protection was extended
exclusively to the literal duplication, the "plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations."
528 F. Supp. at 462 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)).
56. 528 F. Supp. at 463. The court's use of the "fragmented literal similarity" test is
based on the principle that "a work may be substantially diminished even when only part of
it is copied; if the part that is copied is of great qualitative importance to the work as a
whole." Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The "patterns" test refers to the duplication of a pattern of the first author's
19841
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Applying these principles, the court found that there were no signifi-
cant comprehensive non-literal similarities between the two articles.59
Next, the court considered the question of literal similarity.6° In
order to find substantial similarity by way of literal similarity, the court
must determine whether the literal duplication comprises a material
part of the first work.6' This requires the court to look first to the quan-
titative amount of literal duplication in comparison to the total size of
the first article.62 If the quantity copied is insignificant, the court will
look to whether "the language duplicated is material to the copied
work. 63
Applying the aforementioned principles to this case, the court
found that, although Blank had duplicated two lines out of Werlin's
article, these lines were not material to Werlin's work (as is required
when the quantity of duplication is very small).64
After completing its analysis of substantial similarity between
Werlin's and Blank's articles, the court concluded that the two articles
were not substantially similar, and dismissed this part of Werlin's
claim.65
The court turned next to consider plaintiff's claim against RDA for
the misappropriation of her idea.66 In order to successfully maintain a
claim for misappropriation, the plaintiff must prove two things: first,
that the defendant obtained access to the plaintiff's idea either through
an abuse of his fiduciary or confidential relationship with the plaintiff
or through fraud or deception;67 second, "that the defendant's use of
the idea deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to reap its due profits
description of events. See McGraw Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishes, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 420
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
59. 528 F. Supp. at 463. For example, Blank's article focused primarily upon the human
interest story of Rina Cahana, and only slightly addressed Down's Syndrome in any context,
while Werlin's article utilized Rina's Bas Mitzvah as an introduction into her discussion of
Down's Syndrome children. Id.
60. 528 F. Supp. at 463-64.
61. Id. at 463 (citing Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 246 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir.
1957)).
62. Id. at 463-64 (citing 3 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.03[a][2] at 13-32
(1981)).
63. 528 F. Supp. at 464 (citing Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries Co.,
452 F. Supp. 429, 439 (1978)).
64. 528 F. Supp. at 464.
65. Id.
66. Id. The court analyzed this claim under New York tort law. Id.
67. Id. (citing Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),




In the present case, the court found that there was no fiduciary or
confidential relationship between RDA and Werlin and that RDA did
not act in a fraudulent manner.69 Additionally, the court ruled that
Werlin presented no evidence to show that she was deprived of her
opportunity to reap the profits of her idea and therefore failed to meet
the second portion of the test.70 Since RDA did nothing to diminish the
value of Werlin's article to Werlin, the fact that it was of some value to
RDA was irrelevant to her unfair competition claim.7
Finally, the court considered Werlin's claim in quasi-contract on a
theory of unjust enrichment.72 Under New York law, "a contract will
be implied in fact when the evidence shows that the parties clearly in-
tended payment to the extent of use of the plaintiffs idea though they
did not set forth that intention in express language."73 The court found
that there clearly was no express contract between RDA and Werlin
concerning the article she submitted to him in 1978.7' The court did
find an implied-in-fact contract between the parties regarding articles
previously submitted to RDA by Werlin, since both parties clearly con-
templated potential publication and compensation. 75  However, be-
cause Werlin was unaware of RDA's policy of utilizing its own authors
to write on ideas brought to RDA and paying out only a "spotter's fee"
to the original author, there was no implied-in fact contract as to Wer-
lin's 1978 article: neither party expected nor intended payment.76
Nonetheless, the court stated that a defendant may still be liable to
a plaintiff under a theory of unjust enrichment even if no express or
implied-in-fact contract for the sale or use of plaintiffs idea has been
established. 77 This allows a plaintiff to recover in equity when the de-
fendant has unfairly benefited from its use of plaintiffs idea.
New York law requires that a plaintiff first show that the defend-
ant was enriched by the plaintiff.78 This is accomplished by demon-
strating that plaintiffs idea was novel, concrete, and actually
68. 528 F. Supp. at 464 (citation omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 464-65.
71. Id. at 465. It is relevant, however to Werlin's quasi-contract claim. Id.
72. Id.




77. Id. See Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir.
1946).
78. Id. (citations omitted).
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appropriated by defendant. 9 Here, the court found that Werlin estab-
lished all three. Even though Werlin's article had previously been pub-
lished by the Houston's LegalAdvocate, RDA in all likelihood would
have never come across Werlin's article had she not mailed it in. Thus,
to RDA, Werlin's idea was novel. The idea was concrete, since it had
already been developed into an article, and RDA essentially conceded
the fact that it had appropriated Werlin's idea by its development of
the idea into an article published in its periodical."0
Under the second prong of New York's test for unjust enrichment,
the plaintiff must show that the circumstances underlying the defend-
ant's enrichment were such that it would be unjust, both in equity and
good conscience, to allow the defendant to refuse to make any restric-
tion to the plaintiff."' Here, the court found what it termed "a classic
case of unjust enrichment. 81 2 RDA had encouraged Werlin, for nearly
a decade, to submit articles and ideas to RDA for possible publica-
tion.83 Werlin was never told that any of her ideas might ultimately be
prepared by one of RDA's author's, nor was she told that RDA had
serious doubts about her writing ability. 4 Instead, RDA continued to
encourage her in its good-faith belief that she might produce a useable
article.8 5 When Werlin finally did submit a topic which proved to ben-
efit RDA, RDA denied any legal obligation toward her. 6 The court
stated that "[t]o permit RDA to refuse to pay any compensation to
Werlin would be, notwithstanding the fact that RDA did not act in bad
faith, to permit an injustice of the most fundamental sort."8 7
RDA argued in its defense that Werlin's quasi-contract claim, be-
ing based on New York law, should have been preempted by federal
copyright law.88 However, the court found that to the extent that Wer-
lin's submission to RDA was a completed article, it was protected
under the Copyright Act; to the extent that it was merely an idea, it was
not protected under the Act, but rather enjoyed limited protection
79. Id. (citing Seymore v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 257, 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd mem., 657 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1981); Galanis v. Procter & Gamble
Corp., 153 F. Supp. 34, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
80. 528 F. Supp. at 466.
81. Id. at 465.






88. Id. at 467.
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under New York State law.s9
After finding for Werlin on her quasi-contract claim, the court
next addressed the issue of compensation.9° Generally, such compen-
sation would be calculated by reference to the actual value of the bene-
fit received by the defendant, as opposed to the market value of
plaintiff's services rendered. 9' However, since Werlin's quasi-contract
claim was not raised until after she had rested her case, and Werlin had
stipulated that she would be bound to her original record, there had not
been any evidence introduced concerning profits earned by RDA re-
sulting from its use of Werlin's article.92 Therefore, the court limited
damages to five hundred dollars (plus interest), the amount being paid
by RDA in 1978 as a "kill fee."9 3
The effects of this decision are two-fold. On the one hand, the
district court utilized its discretionary powers to create an equitable
remedy where needed to avoid an unfair result. Although this result
was reached ultimately through the use of New York state law, this
decision suggests that this district court may look to the state law to
obtain relief where the federal law does not provide it under like cir-
cumstances. On the other hand, this decision may serve as a warning to
publications to tread more carefully when discussing pay scales with
aspiring writers. RDA suggested that this decision might put them at
risk whenever it encouraged writers or accepted their unsolicited arti-
cles, but the court pointed out that this decision and its holding was
confined only to the facts of this particular case. 94 Although the effects
89. Id. The court noted that:
the elements of a quasi-contract claim are significantly different from those of a
federal copyright claim; moreover, the rights that the doctrine of quasi-contract
seeks to protect are qualitatively different from those that federal copyright law
endeavors to preserve. Under such circumstances, the courts of this Circuit have




91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 466. The key facts leading to this holding were:
(1) RDA encouraged an author to submit her published pieces to be considered
for reprinting;
(2) RDA failed to tell the author that it might use one of the author's published
pieces as an idea for one of its own articles;
(3) RDA also failed to tell the author that it had a very low opinion of her ability
to write an article suitable for republication in Reader's Digest;
(4) the author ultimately submitted an article on a topic that RDA found to be an
excellent idea for an article and that RDA would otherwise not have found;
and
1984]
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of this decision are unclear at this time, the potential for its use as a
precedent in similar federal copyright cases exists and could present
problems to publishers while creating relief for naive writers.
Kimberly Sloan
B. Constitutional Law
1. Child Pornography Not Protected Speech in New York
When the United States Supreme Court began regulating expres-
sion, it categorized different kinds of speech as either protected or un-
protected.' However, it became increasingly wary of any such blanket
prohibitions on expression, and began to create exceptions to these
rigid classifications.2 The Court recently found reason to reverse that
trend by placing child pornography in the category of speech com-
pletely without constitutional protection. In New York v. Ferber,3 the
Court upheld a New York criminal statute4 banning the distribution of
material depicting sexual conduct by children, without a requirement
that the material meet traditional obscenity standards.
In 1978, adult bookstore proprietor Paul Ferber sold two films to
an undercover police officer that depicted young boys masterbating5
He was indicted under section 263.106 and section 263.157 of the New
York Penal Code. Both laws prohibited the promotion of sexual per-
formances by a child, but section 263.15 did not require a showing of
obscenity. Ferber was convicted under section 263.15, and the Appel-
late Division affirmed.8
(5) RDA never asked the author to rewrite her article, but proceeded to use the
topic as the basis for one of its own pieces, which piece became the lead article
in an issue of Reader's Digest.
Id.
1. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 313 U.S. 568 (1942) included "the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words . . ." in a class of speech
clearly prohibitable without constitutional violation. Id. at 571-72.
2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) found protection for some
libelous statements.
3. 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
4. N.Y. Penal Law § 263.15 (McKinney 1980). Under § 263.15, "[a] person is guilty of
promoting a sexual performance by a child when knowing the character and content thereof,
he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child
less than sixteen years of age."
5. 102 S. Ct. at 3352.
6. N.Y. Penal Law § 263.15 (McKinney 1980). See supra note 4.
7. N.Y. Penal Law § 263.10 (McKinney 1980). § 263.10 is nearly identical to § 263.15,
adding only the word obscene.
8. People v. Ferber, 74 A.D.2d 558, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1980).
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The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the statute un-
derinclusive9 and overbroad,"° in violation of the First Amendment. I
The court reasoned that section 263.15 was intended to prohibit the
distribution of protected materials because it did not explicitly include
an obscenity standard, as did section 263.10.12 Implicit in the reason-
ing was the assumption that the traditional standard of obscenity used
in section 263. l0' 3 was appropriate, and that non-obscene sexual con-
duct by children could not be treated specially.' 4
The United States Supreme Court then unanimously upheld the
statute, and effectively created a new class of unprotected speech. The
majority' 5 stressed that the clear and convincing threat to the welfare of
children in this case outweighed any possible invasions of First
Amendment rights.
The Court cited five reasons to justify its distinction between child
pornography and other pornography. First, it deferred to the judgment
of the New York legislature that the use of children as subjects of por-
nographic materials was harmful to the physiological, emotional and
mental health of the child. 16 The Court then recognized that it had
previously acted to protect children from exposure to non-obscene
literature 7 and had justified special treatment of indecent but not ob-
scene broadcasting received by children.18 Second, it found that the
standard of obscenity set forth in Miller v. California 19 was not a satis-
factory solution to the problem of child pornography. Materials ex-
ploiting children may not be patently offensive or appeal to the average
prurient interest, and they may contain some value. Such characteris-
9. The court noted that § 263.15 did not prohibit the distribution of materials depicting
non-sexual activities equally dangerous to children. Id.
10. The court stressed that § 263.15 also prohibited non-obscene materials depicting sex-
ual conduct by children, such as medical or educational treatments. Id.
11. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981).
12. Id. at 678.
13. The court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) held that "a state offense must
also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24. Since Miller, the U.S.
Supreme Court and most state statutes have adhered to its guidelines.
14. 102 S. Ct. at 3352.
15. Justice White spoke for the 5-member majority. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring
opinion. Justice Blackmun concurred without an opinion. Justice Stevens, and Justice
Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) both filed opinions concurring in the judgment only.
16. 102 S. Ct. at 3355.
17. Ginsberg v. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
18. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
19. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24. See supra note 13.
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tics, however, would not diminish the harm to a child portrayed
therein.20
Third, the distribution of such materials was an integral part of
their production, which was illegal in all fifty states. Current produc-
tion laws have, however, been difficult, if not impossible to enforce
against the low-profile industry. The Court saw that enforcement of
distribution laws could greatly enhance the efficient curtailment of the
industry, with no greater threat to Fifth Amendment freedom than that
caused by the production laws.21 Fourth, the value of allowing chil-
dren to appear in such films was exceeding modest, if not de minimus,22
compared to a relatively slight cost to free speech.23 Fifth, it was allow-
able to classify speech on the basis of its content24 where the "evil to be
restricted overwhelmingly outweighs" the First Amendment interests in
free expression.25
After the Court concluded that section 263.15 explicitly singled out
this type of material for prohibition, and was thus not underinclusive,26
it addressed Ferber's claim that the statute was overbroad. The Court
began by stating that "the traditional rule is that a person to whom a
statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute
on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
others in situations not before the court. ' 27 However, an exception to
this principle is known as the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine,
which reflects the concern that "persons whose expression is constitu-
tionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear
of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected
expression. ' 28 Use of the doctrine has been limited with respect to reg-
ulation of conduct, and the court has insisted that the overbreadth be
substantial before a facial invalidation can occur.29
20. 102 S. Ct. at 3356-57. The court also pointed out that if the distribution of these
materials was heavily sanctioned, then the market would dry up for the producers, effec-
tively curtailing the exploitation of children.
21. Id. at 3357.
22. Id.
23. Id. The trial court had suggested that a person over the statutory age who looked
younger could be used if necessary for a literary, artistic, scientific, or educational work.
24. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 742-48 (1978). See supra note 18.
See also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libelous publications generally
without first amendment protection).
25. 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
26. Id. at 3359.
27. Id. at 3360.
28. Id. 3361 (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S.
620, 634 (1980)).
29. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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The New York Court of Appeals failed to apply this analysis, as it
found the statute to be directed at pure speech. The court then found
the statute to be fatally overbroad, as it would include medical and
educational materials as well as hardcore pornography.3" The Supreme
Court, however, saw it as conduct plus speech, and found the above
analysis applicable. It then held that section 263.15 was a classic case
of a "statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible
applications,"'3 and thus was not substantially overbroad.
The Ferber majority left open the question of First Amendment
protection for the materials if they had any serious literary, artistic or
educational value, which prompted comment in the concurring opin-
ions. Justice O'Connor was alone in stating that such material should
also be prohibited, as the audience's appreciation of the depiction is
simply irrelevant to New York's asserted purpose of protecting children
from physiological, emotional and mental harm.32 That may be true,
but that was not the only interest the Ferber court considered. The
concurrences of Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) and Jus-
tice Stevens suggested that a ban on materials with any serious value
would violate the First Amendment. Justice Brennan justified in-
creased First Amendment protection by explaining that such depictions
would not threaten the same harms to a child, and the production of
those materials is not by the low-profile industry that produces purely
pornographic materials.
33
Further, there is direct evidence in the majority's opinion that even
the majority would not go so far as to prohibit distribution of materials
with some value. It relief heavily on the unique relationship between
the production and distribution branches of pure pornography,34 and
on the evidence of harm to children used to produce it.35 However, the
use of children in works of socially redeeming value would not prompt
the same reaction, and the delicate balance would most likely need to
be restruck. Finally, the term "child pornography" was consistently
used by the Court. This could have meant that a depiction of a sexual
act by a child in a non-pornographic work with socially redeeming
value should remain protected.
The foregoing arguments probably explain the Court's decision to
30. 52 N.Y.2d at 678.
31. 102 S. Ct. at 3363.
32. Id. at 3364.
33. Id. at 3365-67.
34. Id. at 3356.
35. Id. at 3355 n.8-10.
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afford this material no protection, rather than place any restrictions on
it. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the Court subjected non-
obscene, but sexually graphic films to time, place and manner restric-
tions.3 6 But there, the need to protect the interests of America's young
was not really at issue, nor was the uniquely dependent relationship
between the production and distribution of child pornography. There-
fore, the holding in Ferber could logically be seen as being limited to its
unique facts, and not interpreted as a signal that the Court intends to
further erode previously protected First Amendment freedoms.
David Keitel
36. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinace restricting location of theatres exhib-
iting sexually explicit but not legally obscene films).
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